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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEWIS BROS. STAGES, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COl\IMISSION OF
UTAH; HALF. BENNETT, DONALD HACK
ING; and DONALD T. ADAMS, its ;nembers;
and WYCOFF COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Case No.
11081

LINK TRUCKING, INC .. UINTAH FREIGHTW A YS, a corporation, MILNE TRUCK LINES,
INC., PALMER BROTHERS, INCORPORATED,
RIO GRANDE MOTOR WAY, INC., LAKE
SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC., DENVER-SALT LAKE-PACIFIC STAGES, INC.,
and CONTINENTAL BUS SYSTEM, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No.
11082

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UT AH,
DONALD HACKING, DON T. ADAMS and
HALS. BENNETT, Commissioners of the Public Service Commission of Utah, and WYCOFF
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Defendants.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION
BY 'VYCOFF COMPANY, INCORPORATED
5

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a petition for rehearing or reconsideration
of the decision which was issued under date of March
24, 1969, whereby the majority of the court directed
that the Certificate issued in 1967 by the Commission
to the applicant be set aside and that the entire matter
be held by the Public Service Commission until the
transcript of the record is complete, has been reviewed
by the Commission and then returned to this court. The
case was an application by \Vycoff Company for an
extension of its express authority and was heard before
an Examiner duly appointed by the Commission without
any objection from any of the parties protestant and
the hearings were completed on September 9, 1969.
The applicant and protestants submitted briefs to the
Examiner and then to the Commission and argued
their matters, and the Commission then received the
Report, Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommended Order from the Examiner on May 10, 1967,
and then after hearing arguments and consideration
of the briefs of the parties and the report of the Examiner, adopted such as its own and issued its report and
recommended order on September 12, 1967.

DISPOSITION BY THE UTAH PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
As indicated above in the Statement, the Commission appointed a hearing examiner, Mr. Lorin F. Broad-
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bent, prior to the time of the commencement of this
case and assigned him to hear the evidence on this
matter, which he did, and made of course notes thereon
and heard the argument of counsel as well as having
seen the witnesses themselves, received memoranda
from counsel for all parties, and then submitted and
filed his findings of fact, conclusions and recommended order to the Commission. Thereafter the Commissioners reviewed memoranda from the parties, argument from the parties and made and filed its report
and order, favorable to the applicant, which report and
order consist of 21 pages, showing that a very thorough
consideration had been given to all of the vital elements,
namely: the needs of the shipping public, the rights
and responsibilities of the various carriers involved,
the protection of necessary service, and a determination
was made by the Commission that an extension of the
express rights should be granted.
No objection was made at any stage of the proceedings by any of the protestants to the use of an
examiner or to the determination so made by the Commission until well after the final decision had been made.
Petitions for rehearing and reconsideration were filed
by each of the appealing protestants, and in the grounds
for rehearing or reconsideration none set forth an objection to:
(a) The use of an examiner for the hearing
of the evidence;
( b) The right of the Commission to act in
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response to the recommended report of the examiner and the memoranda and arguments submitted
by the various parties prior to its consideration and
decision; and
( c) The
mony before
hearing and
report of the

absence of a transcript of the testithe Commission at the time of the
determination of the recommended
examiner.

The record before the Commission also shows that
on May 10, 1967, after the report and order of the
Examiner had been filed and made available to all
parties, the Commission issued its "Notice and Order
Fixing Time on Filing Exceptions'', granting to each
and all parties 30 days from date of service within which
to file exceptions respecting the statements of fact,
conclusions of law, and designating that the Commission may hereafter fix an appropriate time and place for
oral argument upon the exceptions, if there be any;
and then stating:
"The Order herein shall not become an effective order as the order of the Commission until the
final order of the Commission issues."
Then such final order was issued on September 12.
1967, consisting of some 21 pages, showing full and
thorough consideration.
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STATEMENT O.F .FACTS
\Ve shall not attempt to repeat the facts as set fortli
in the briefs, but only as relevant to reconsideration of
this particular matter raised by the court as a result
of the failure of the protestants to provide to the Commission a transcript of the testimony so that the same
could be certified to this court for its consideration on
tlie appeal. To this end, we believe that a chronolgy of
the case may be helpful:
1964 - Application for extension of authority

filed by Wycoff.
Nov. 8, 1965 - Conference held before the
Commission on initial hearing date following notice
given by mail and publication and, after discussion, the Commission advised all parties and orderd
that the actual hearings would be before the Commissioner's examiner, Lorin J. Broadbent, and
would commence at a date upon which notice
would be given. No objections were made by any
of the protestants to such proceeding.
Jan. 10, 1966 - Hearings commenced before
Examiner Lorin J. Broadbent, and were held at
Salt Lake City, Logan, Vernal, Moab, Richfield,
and Cedar City.
September 9, 1966 - Hearings completed.
November, 1966 - Applicant and the protestants prepared and submitted briefs to the Examiner and the Commission in support of their respective positions.
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May 10, 1967 - Examiner's report and order
issued and served on all parties ( 18 pages).
May 10, 1967 - 30 days time fixed for fili 1w0 '
exceptions. (Note that all parties had heretofore
briefed the matter for the Examiner and the Commission).
July 10, 1967 - Case submitted to the Commission for review of the decision of the Examiner
and the briefs, memoranda and exceptions of the
various parties.
September 12, 1967 - Report and order of the
Commission issuing Certificate Nos. 1608 and 1609,
wherein all of the operating authority of Wycoff
Company was considered and the new authority
recommended and issued in a Certificate authorizing express service on a statewide basis of shipments not to exceed 250 pounds for any shipper ,
on any day.
October, 1967 - Petitions for rehearing and
reconsideration were timely filed by the protestants.
October 18, 1967 - Order denying petitions
for rehearing and reconsideration issued.
November, 1967 - Petitions for writ of cer·
tiorari filed and writs issued directing the Com·
mission to ceritfy the record to this court within
30 days.
March 13, 1968

Motions of Lewis Brothers ~
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Stages, et al. for extensions of time within which
the Conunission is required to certify and file the
record.
April 1, 1968 - Hearing of motion for extension of time for filing the record (this is the first
time anyone heard a suggestion that the case be
considered by your court on the basis of the files,
exhibits, memoranda and briefs of the parties without a transcript of the testimony).
April 10, 1968 - Order of the Court that
case be presented for review to this Court on
findings and report of the Examiner and upon
memoranda of the respective parties "in lieu of
transcript of the evidence."

the
the
the
the

July and August, 1968 - Briefs of parties filed.
October, 1968 - Case argued before the Supreme Court, based upon the record prescribed by
the court.
March 24, 1969 - Decision.
One further material fact should be considered by
the Court, and that is the established practice that the
party taking an appeal from an order of the Commission procure, at its expense, from the reporter a transcript of the testimony and supply it to the Commission
for certification within a 30 day period. Due to the
numerous witnesses involved, the extensive period of
time encompassed in the hearing and the unusually
busy schedule of Mr. Clair Johnson, the court reporter
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serving the Commission, the appealing protestant motur
carriers were unable to procure from him a transcript
of the testimony within the time required by the original
order of the \V rit of Review or within the extended
time allowed by the court. He has not even yet prepared such a transcript. \Vhether l\'Ir. Johnson would
have prepared such a transcript had the appellants
ordered more than one copy does not appear from the
record, but the facts are absolutely without contradicton that \:V ycoff Company had no duty to procure and
furnish such transcript of the testimony to the Commission, and has done nothing to prejudice the rights
of the appealing parties, and did not make any objection
to an extension of time by this court for the supplying
of such record until in l\'Iarch of 1968, when the appel· '
lant motor carriers represented to this court that it
would be "at least one year for him to complete the
transcript'', which seemed an extraordinarily long time
following the issuance of the report and order in September of 1967.
The decision places in doubt the right of the Com·
mission to utilize an examiner, notwithstanding the
provisions of the statute making such appropriate and
seems to infer that all of the Commissioners must be
present at every hearing. This would stifle its capability of conducting the manifold responsibilites imposed
upon it by the Utah Legislature, as the Commissioners
also act as the Securities Commission, the Department
of Business Regulation, etc. A new procedure woul<l ,
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to be imposed by this Decision whereby it is
neces~ary that, if au examiner is used, a transcript of
the testimony be prepared in every case before submission to the Commissioners, and requiring them to duplicate the efforts of the examiner by rereading the tra11snipt of the testimony before they can receive, accept,
adopt and file the report of the examiner.
Sf'Clll

ARGUMENT ON PETITION
POINT I
APPELLANT-liROTESTAN'l'S HA\'E NO'l'
COMPLIED 'i\TITH SECTION 54-7-17 U.C.A.
1953 FOR A STAY AND THE COURT .MAY
NOT 'V AI\'E PROOF OF GREAT AND IRREP ARAllLE DA.MAGE AND POSTING OF
BOND.
The Legislature of Utah made provisions for a
stay of an order of the Commission pending review
by this court. That is set forth in Section 54-7-17,
U.C.A. 1953, and the conditions and procedure are
detailed as guidance for the court and for all parties
who are interested in such a matter. 'Ve submit that
because the Legislature has acted upon stays, that the
procedure as outlined must be followed by this Court
and by all concerned. Subsection 1 of that statute
provi<les that the pendency of a writ of review shall
not itself stay or suspend the operation of the order
or decision of the Commission, and then grants to the
13

Court, in its discretion, the right to stay or suspend,
in whole or in part, the operation of the Commissiou's
order or decision. Subparagraph 2 is very specific that
"no order so staying or suspending an order or decision of the Commission shall be made by the Supreme
Court otherwise than upon three days notice and after
hearing and the order suspending the same shall contain a specific finding based upon evidence submitted
to the court and identified by reference thereto, that
great or irreparable damage would otherwise result
to the petitioner, and specifying the nature of the damage.
Here we have no petitioner requesting such
relief and we have no allegations upon which a showing
of great and irreparable damage could be predicated,
and nothing of that nature has been mentioned in the
decision of March 24, 1969 issued by this court.
Subparagraph 3 of that statute states that the order
of the court staying a decision of the Commission shall
not become effective until a suspending bond shall "first
have been executed and filed with and approved by '
the Commission, (or approved upon review by the Su·
preme Court) payable to the State of Utah and sufficient in amount and security to insure the prompt pay·
ment by the party petitioning for the review of all
damages caused by the delay in the enforcement of the
order or decision of the Commission . . . "
As applied to our present circumstance, the public
and 'Vycoff Company have come to rely upon the deci·
sion of the Commission and the certificate issued by it
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in September of 19G7, and the service so authorized lias
Leen carrie<l forward continuously since that time.
liefore any order of suspension or stay of the eifectiv.:uess of the said eertificate issued by the Commission
is had, a very substantial bond should be posted by
the appealing motor carriers. No showing of any great
or irreparable harm has been identified by the appellantprotestant motor carriers upon which the "specific finding" referred to in lhe statute could be based, and we
submit that 110 such a great or irreparable damage or
harm could be shown by any of the motor carriers, particularly at this late date after the 'Vrit of Review
has been outstanding for over a year. \Ve feel certain
that the appellant-protestants in this proceeding did
uot ask for a stay because they recognized the responsibility 'vihch would adhere to them, had they posted a
bond and sought the relief which has been gratuitiously
extended to them by the order of the court. A careful
review of the various petitions for writ of certiorari and
review show that each protestant-appellant has sought
merely for a review of the proceedings and a reversal
of the order of the Commission.

POINT II
THE USE 01'~ AN EXAJ\UNER FOR THE
HE.1\RING OF THE EYIDENCE IS PLACED
IN QUESTION.
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POINT III
THE RIGHT OF THE COM~IISSION TO
ACT IN RESPONSE TO THE RECOlVIMENDED REPORT OF THE EXAMINER AND THE
MEMORANDA AND ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES PRIOR
TO ITS CONSIDERATION AND DECISION
SHOULD BE CLARIFIED NOW.
Since the formation of the Commission it has Leen
empowered to transact business and given quite a wide
latitude in its performance of such regulatory powers
over the public utilities of the State of Utah. In Section
54-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, it provides that "any investigation, inquiry or hearing which the Commission has
power to undertake or to hold may be undertaken or
held "by or before any commissioner or an examiner
appointed by the Commission. All investigations, inquiries and hearings by a commissioner or an examiner
appointed by the Commission shall be deemed to be
the investigations, inquiries and hearings of the Commission; and all findings, orders or decisions made by
a commissioner or an examiner appointed by the Com- ,
mission, when approved and confirmed by the Commission and filed in its off ice, shall be deemed the findings,
orders or decisions of the Commission, shall have the
same effect as if originally made by the Commission."
In reviewing the legislative history of this, we note
that the section as quoted above came into being in that
form by the Laws of Utah 1951, Chapter 88, when sec-
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tion 76-1-4 of the Utah Code Annotated 1943 was
amended, so as to empower the Commission to utilize
an examiner. The prior statute had authorized the holding of investigations, inquiries and hearings by a single
commissioner, and that the findings, orders and decisions
of such single commissioner, when approved and confirmed by the Commission and filed in its off ice, should
be the act of the Commission as a whole. In the 1951
Session Laws, the provision for an examiner was added
along with the single commissioner, so that as the statute
now reads it is possible for a single commissioner or a
single examiner to conduct the hearings; and by f allowing the procedure thus stated the findings, orders
or decisions made by the commissioner or the examiner
"when approved and confirmed by Commission and
filed in its office, shall be deemed the findings, orders
or decision of the Commission, and shall have the same
effect as if originally made by the Commission."

It would seem apparent that at this point that the
decision of the court issued in this case has cast doubt
upon the legality of all proceedings had by the Commission during the past years where only one Commissioner has sat in at the hearing, which has generally
been the pattern before the appointment of an examiner
in 1967, and that all of the decisions made by the examiner since 1967 and approved by the Commission
are likewise questionable.
The right of a single commissioner to act on behalf
of the Commission at the taking of evidence is now on
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the same level and the same basis as the right oi' the 1
examiner, and vice versa, as a result of the 1951 amendment of the statute. \Ve believe that the Conmussio 11
would be hard-pressed to show any motor carrier case
in which the hearings through the years by a single
commissioner or by an examiner have been followed
by a transcript of the testimony and submitted to tile
Commission before it made its determination as a >d10le. ,
Customarily the orders of the Commission bear the
names of all or at least two of the Conunissiouers
though in only rare occasions have all of the commissioners sat. At the inception of this present 'Vycoff
case in 1966, all of the commissioners were present when
the decision was made to utilize an examiner, and uu
objection was made by any of the protestants to this.
as all recognized that this would be a long case, imohing a number of witnesses, and the Commissioners them·
selves did not have the time to deYote to a case so exten·
sive as they have a host of other duties and responsi·
bilities which they must perform.
The utilizatio11 of an examiner for the taking of
evidence and the submission of a proposed report au<l •
order is not a unique, new practice which has been
dreamed up by the State of Utah without ample con·
sideration. The general pattern of the Interstate Com·
merce Commission since the time of its formation in
the supenision of motor carriers in 1935 has been th:d
an examiner is designated by the commission to trawl
to the various states and localities where the hearing 1
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are being held to take the evidence, consider the exhibits
and then make a recommended report and order to
the Commission. Then each party has a right to file
exceptions (just as the Commission prescribed in this
particular case) and then the decision is made by the
Commission as to the final order.
The Public Service Commission of Utah has patterned its activities in this case to follow the established
and court-approved procedure of the Interstate Commerce Commission, having in mind the element of fairness and the opportunity for all to present their positions through exceptions to the examiner's report. Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, a party may
purchase a copy of the transcript it desires or it may
prepare exceptions based upon its own notes and records
of the case. So too, in our present case the commission
designated an examiner to hear the testimony. The
hearings were completed in the various parts of the
state by September 9, 1966, and the report and recommended order of the examiner was not issued until
May 10 of 1967. During that period of over one-half
a year, had the appellant-protestants so desired, they
could have procured a transcript of the testimony then,
before l\lr. Johnson became so busy with some major
utility work at a later date.
During that period of time all of the protestants,
as well as the applicant, submitted to the examiner
memoranda in support of their respective positions, outlining the impact, if any, which the grant of the appli-
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cation might haYe, the needs and requirements of the
shippers and the service being performed and available
to the public. None of these appellant-protestants
elected to purchase a transcript of the testimony at that
time, and none has done so to this date, though we
recognize that such is probably not their fault, though
they delayed until well after the decision by the Commission before ordering such a transcript.
The passage of time in this case, as well as the
magnitude of the case, is greater than any which the
Commission has ever had on motor carriers before iu
its history, and by the same token greater care, concern
and consideration were given to this case than any other
case which has been handled by the Commission in past
years. The thoroughness of the report and recommended
order of the examiner issued on May 10, 1967 is significant, and in addition to that the even greater
thoroughness and completenes of the report and order
of the Commission issued September 12, 1967 is impressive in its evaluation of all of the elements necessary
for a valid order, the impact upon the other carriers
and the granting of a lesser authority than applied for
by the applicant. It is to be noted that Section 541-o-5
relating to the granting of certificates of convenience
and necessity by the Commission reads in part:

"If the Commission finds from the evidence

that the public convenience and necessity require
the proposed service, or any part thereof, it may
issue a ceritficate as prayed for, or issue it for the
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partial ctl::ercise only of the privilege sought, and

may attach to the exercise of the right granted by
such certificate such terms and conditions as in its
judgment the public convenience and necessity
may require, otherwise such certificates shall be
denied." (Emphasis ours).
Certainly the mandate of this section has been fully
realized, as a lesser amount of authority was granted
than prayed, and key restrictions were imposed in the
wisdom of the Commission.
This Court has erred in its interim order setting
aside the decision of the Commission and its Certificate
on a partial record, and in the face of testimony of over
200 public shipper witnesses. The Court, while declaring that it could not decide the case because of lack
of a transcript, has nevertheless substituted its judgment for that of the examiner and of the Commission.
No vacating and setting aside of the certificate should
be granted as the protestant-appellants have had full
protection of their positions by the examiner and the
Commission.

POINT IV
THIS DECISION AND SETTING ASIDE
BY THE COURT IS CONTRARY TO THE
PROYISIONS OF SECTION 5~-7-10, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 'VHICH PROYIDES THAT ORDERS OF THE COMMIS-
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SION OF THEIR O\\TN FORCE SHALL
"TAKE EFFECT AND BECOME OPERATIYE
TWENTY DAYS AFTER THE SERVICE
THEREOF."
The Legislature m the enactment of the public
utility laws, and particularly those relating to motor
carriers, felt that once the Commission had entered
its Report and Order that such should become effective
unless the steps prescribed by statute for the posting
of a bond and procuring a stay of the effective date
were folowed by the appellant-protestants. To this
end, in Section 54-7-10 U.C.A. 1953, it was provided
that after conclusion of the hearing the Commission
shall make and file its order containing its decision. Then
a requirement that a copy of such order, certified under
the seal of the Commission, shall be served upon the
corporation, the persons complained of or its attorney.
And then it reads:
"Said order shall of its own force take effect
and become operative 20 days after the service
thereof, except as otherwise provided in such order,
and shall continue in force either for a period which
may be designated then or until changed or abro·
gated by the Commission."
The Commission's order in this proceeding in issuing
Certificate No. 1068 to 'Vycoff Company, Incorporatea
imposed no restriction for the effective date and imposed
no limitation as to the time and service, but rather
directed specifically that the "applicant shall render
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reasonable, adequate and continuous service in pursuance of the authority herein granted, and failure to
<lo so shall constitute sufficient grounds for termination
and suspension of the said certificate."
As directed by said order, the applicant did file its
necessary tariffs and proceed with the rendition of
service, and has been doing so continuously ever smce
the date of said order in September of 1967.
As we read the statutes, the said order becomes
effective and continues in force as prescribed by Section
.54-7 -10 unless and until there has been a reversal of the
order by this Commission after a full hearing of the
matter, or there has been a stay granted under the bond
and other procedures set forth in Section 54-7 -17. No
one will contend that there has been a full hearing on
review of this case, because the decision of this court
makes it very clear that such has not been done, and
could not be done without a transcript of the testimony
being made available to this court. And who has the
duty to provide such a transcript for the Commission
to be certified to this court? This duty is imposed by
custom and practice on the appellant-protestants, and
mch duty was known to them at the time of the commencement of this case, at the time of the preparation
and the submission of memoranda to the examiner
dming the better than one-half year that he had the
matter under advisement and consideration, and at all
times thereafter.
'Ve do not have the problem of a small motor
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carrier taking an appeal and being unable to afford the
necessary funds to pay a court reporter to transcribe
the testimony, but rather here we have the combined
financial resources of the major bus lines, the major
truck lines of this whole state of Utah, which could be
marshalled to pay the court reporter for the transcribing
of the testimony which was completed back in September of 1966. Certainly their knowledge of the fact
that Mr. Johnson was busy did not foreclose the duty
which they had to the Commission to supply a tran·
script, even if it meant hiring a skilled stenographer
to transcribe from the tape of the record which l\Ir.
Johnson took of the entire proceedings, the words which
were spoken by all parties, the examiner and the parti·
cipants in the proceedings. No hardship can be claimed
by them except that they have failed to place sufficient
financial inducements before either Mr. Johnson or
some stenographer to make the transcription so as to
have it available for the court so that a complete review
of the matter could be had.
We would urge that if a prejudice is to be suffered
in this proceeding, that it should not be imposed upon
Wycoff Company and the public as a result of this
failure, but that the appellant-protestants should suffer
part of the responsibility and prejudice, if any does
arise. At no time have we ever contended before this
court that a full and complete review of the case should
be had without a transcript of the testimony. 'Ve know
as do all other parties, that such has been the custom
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and the practice, and that it is the duty of the appellant
to provide it for the court so that the court can be fully
advised of the scope of the evidence, the needs of the
shipper witnesses, the availability of the protestants'
service, etc. But the failure to provide such should not
result in a dismissal of the action of the Commission
through a suspension and setting aside of the Order
which it has granted, but rather should be placed in
proper perspective and result only in a continuation of
the hearing of the case by the Supreme Court until
and when such a transcript has been purchased and
supplied to the Commission for certification to this court
so the appeal can be completed.
It was not until the hearing of a .Motion before
this court on April 1, 1968 that the parties had ever
considered the possibility of this case being heard by
the Court without a transcript of the testimony. It is
our recollection that such was at the suggestion of
members of the Court as a possible alternate, and only
then did any objection come forward from the protestants to that plan. Aside from this being a new and
different procedure, we feel certain that the Court had
hoped that the parties might agree upon the Statement
of Facts as set forth in their briefs. Without claiming
any special virtue for the Appendix of the testimony
of the supporting shippers, consisting of some 78 pages
attached to the brief of the defendant Wycoff Company, and the complete absence of any such summary
of the testimony of the shipper witnesses by any other
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party to the proceeding, we at least must assert th,
at this point it is before the court and that there m
and is substantial proof of the fact that there w0
extensive public shipper testimony to support each an1
every segment of the order of the Commission in th1,
proceeding. The fact that the protestant motor carrier,
who had the duty to supply the transcript for this court
have failed to stipulate or agree to those facts (and 11r
never required them to do so), does not mean that llF
Commission was without any jurisdiction or basis ir
its review of the 18 page Report and Order of th
examiner, review of the memoranda submitted by tn1
parties and following the recommended report of \ll,
examiner while the matters were very fresh in lni
minds of all parties. The issuance of its report an1;
order and the certificate as has been done in this pr(
ceeding was in conformance with its stautory dufo
1

POINT V

THIS DECISION AND SETTING ASIDE
BY THE COURT REVERSES THE STATl"
TORY MANDATE OF SECTION 54-7-10.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, STATING
THAT THE "l~INDINGS AND CONCLUSIO~~
OF THE CO.MMISSION ON QUESTIONS Of e:
FACT SHALL BE l?IN AL AND SHALL NO'l rr
BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW."
n

Lewis v. TV ycoff l . . o., I nc., 18

P. 2d 264.
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u.

(2d) 255, 4~1

C(

Ol

"It is not our prerogative to pass upon the wisdom of the Commission's decision. It is charged
with the responsibility of general supervision
awl regulation of the common carriers of this
state and of seeing that the public receives the
most efficient and econornical service possible.
This requires consideration not only of the immediate advantage that may inure to some members of the public and/or to the applying carrier,
but also of the long-range needs of safeguarding
the economic stability and continuity of existing
services. The power with which the Commission
is invested to perform this duty is, of course, not
arbitrary. It must be exercised with reason and
within the scope of the authority given it by law.
The assurance that it does so is safeguarded by
the right of review by this court.
"Due to the responsibility imposed upon the
Commission, and its presumed knowledge and
expertise in this field, its findings and order are
supported by certain well-recognized rules of review. They are endowed with a presumption of
validity and correctness; and the burden is upon
the pl~intiff to show that they are in error. We
survey the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining them; and we will not reverse unless
there is no reasonable basis therein to support
them so that it appears that the Commission's
action was capricious and arbitrary."
The above stated quotation is not an isolated
expression of this Court on the function of the Commission. By statute, Section 54-7-16, and by judicial
interpretation the presumption of validity of the proceedings is strong. The burden of persuasion is clear
on the appellants (plaintiffs) to show from the record
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that the action of the Commission was arbitrary a11
capricious, or that it has exceeded its jurisdiction.

c

a

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING
INTERIM ORDER CANCELLING THE
TRATING AUTHORITY.

a

m
or

Without detailing the several other bases of tn
grounds for reconsideration, may we summarize sue
in this sentence. 'Vycoff Company's certificate is bein1
revoked erroneously because the appellant-protestanl·
failed to procure a transcript of testimony for tliei
appeal.
The obvious injustice of setting aside a bona M
order of the Commission, without a review of the er1
dence by this Court, should be apparent. A parallt
circumstance would be for this Court, on an appeal frou
a District Court decision in a law case to reverse ani
set aside a judgment for the plaintiff on the grouna,
that the appellant had failed to supply a transcript o
the trial to the Clerk of Court for certification or
appeal.
The action of this Court is akin to declaring tba
a trial judge may not make any decision, even afte:
hearing the case without a jury, hearing the argument
of counsel and receiving post-trial memoranda froc
both sides, because he failed to have a transcript r
testimony prepared before rendering judgment. T~
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examiner selected and designated by the Commission
for hearing applicatons sits in the same basic position
as a trial judge. He is a lawyer trained in the evaluation of evidence and empowered by the Legislature
to make findings, conclusions and decisions, the same
as any individual Commissioner. That the Commission
must ratify and adopt such and file the same before
they become binding on the parties does not change
the efficacy of the administrative process.
Frequent decisions of this Court have averred to
"The time-honored precedent of requiring survey of
the evidence in the light favorable to the findings of
the trial court and of indulging credit to his determination." The same precedent respect and presumption
of correctness applies with even more force to those
made by the Commission, because such is fortified by a
statutory directive.
The growth and development of administrative
law in the past 50 years has been essential to the efficient
and equitable applictaion of regulatory statutes. Commissions, such as our Public Service Commission of
Utah, are frequently manned by laymen not trained
in the law. Their quasi-judicial functions are fully
recognized as being part of the due process requirement.
When, under proper statutory authorization, the services of a legally trained attorney are engaged in the
capacity of a hearing examiner to attend and take
evidence on applications, such should be encouraged
and not be destroyed by a decision such as this.
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May we urge the Court to honor and respect th.
statutory law, as well as the prior decisions of this Cour1
The pertinent factors which would appear to sustair1
the certificate of the Commission against this untimeh
interim revocation are·.
·

ti
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Section 54-1-6 U.C.A. 1953
authorizing appointment of an examiner anJ C
his powers adopted by the Commission;
b
Section 54-7-10
the orders are effective 20 days after service
Section 54-7-16
findings and conclusions on questions of fac'.
not subject to review.
That the issue of the authority of the examiner
to act is a completely new development will be observed
from reading the points in the appellant-protestanh
briefs. Not one asserted that he had no authority tu
hear and render a decision to the Court. All partie!
had wholeheartedly accepted and participated in tht
hearings without objection.
The nearest any of the appellant-protestants cami
to this issue was Point III in the Milne et al brief.
which complained that an absence of a transcript (whicl
they should have provided) "denies the plaintiffs o:
their lawful rights to a decision by the Commission am
to a review by this Court of the Commission's order
The discussion of this point was directed to the pron
sions of Section 54-7-10 relating to the need of a trafr
script before this Court for review.
30
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The Court may recall that nothing was said about
the role and functions of the examiner in the \Vycoff
brief because it had not been raised on appeal. Howerer, counsel for \Vycoff did, in the oral argument,
cite that Section 54-1-6 U.C.A. 1953 to the Court to
ilt1tline more fully the background and to remind the
Court that both the examiner and the Commission had
before them the memoranda of all parties prior to the
rrndition of their respective decisions.

CONCLUSION
r

1
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!

e

\Ve would most strongly urge the Court to reconsider its decision which has set aside the certificate issued
by the Commission in this case. It would appear proper
to hold the case before the Court for continuation of
the appeal without prejudice to the positions of any
party. A mandate should go out directing the preparation and filing of the transcript in accordance with
the established custom and granting a reasonable time
to accomplish such.

The failure of this Court to rectify the impact of
this interim decision will be tragic for all administrative
1i
law in Utah. The usefulness of a statutory examiner
r by an administrative body will be nullified. The possibility for a single Commissioner to hear applications,
rate matters, etc., will be negatived also. The work of
r
the reporter will be doubled if he must prepare a transcript of every case. The Commissioners are too heavily
1
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burdened with other duties and statutory responsiM.
ties to attend en masse all hearings and their qua1,
judicial functions will be crippled.
We cannot possibly over-emphasize the unfortu.
nate impact of this decision on the Commission. S1
too on Wycoff Company its certificate will be stayen
and revoked without the filing of a bond or the givini
of any protection to it or the public, nor a showin1
of arbitrary or capricious action by the Commission
The Commission's decision is prima facie valii
and binding. The Court says it cannot review it as lni
record is not complete, so obviously it should not attemp:
to affirm or to revoke that decision of the Commission
in whole or in part, without a complete record. Commo~
justice dictates the continuance of the Commission'
order, made in pursuance of statutory authority, un\i
review of the complete record has been had.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
ZAR E. HAYES
400 El Paso Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Wycoff Company
Incorporated
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